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Abstract. The community concept has maintained a constant and growing interest in urban studies and many related fields. The 
origin of this continuing interest seems to derive from the importance of the concept of community within diverse forms of political 
language and interpretations within different planning practices. In this contribution, through the analysis of different ethical and 
planning theories, we want to provide an update framework on community action. According to this objective, the argumentation 
will proceed through a literature review on four ethics theories and three key aspects related to spatial planning, as well as matching 
this theoretical analysis with exemplifying practices. The final objective is to provide an original analysis on drivers and outcomes 
of different forms of community, raising general issues that refer to spatial planning, social organization and regulation.
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Introduction: the concern for communities
In recent years there has been an increasing interest 
in the debate on the role of communities in urban 
studies. Furthermore, the literature developed dur-
ing these years reveals some particular aspects of 
this topic in relevant debates such as the definition of 
community development in planning (Phillips, Pittman 
2014), the various views of local governance and loc-
alism (Davoudi, Madanipour 2015) and the different 
interpretations of the planning practices within the 
community action (Gallent, Ciaffi 2014). The origin of 
this continuing interest seems to derive from the im-
portance of the concept of community within large 
and diverse forms of political language. Therefore, 
this interest seem to grow together with the crisis of 
participation in democratic systems, as the Economist 
Intelligence Unit (EIU 2015) “Democracy and its dis-
contents” report suggests for the whole of western so-
ciety1 (the EU in particular) during the past five years. 
The diverse and new meaningful roles given by politi-
cians to local communities also seems to derive from 
1 Measuring the participation rate in General Elections over the 
last five years.
the critiques of central government and bureaucratic 
systems for their inability to respond to environmental 
challenges and social inequalities. This inability stems 
from a lack of freedom, which enables public policy to 
promote self-reliant initiatives (Sen 1990) based on the 
“ambitious” assumption that the needs of communit-
ies can be readily and broadly categorized and serviced 
remotely (Habermas 1984). We can briefly define these 
evident difficulties in public policies and planning 
models as the inability to reach a precise “object and 
subject” (Fainstein 2000). This political phase is thor-
oughly described by the geographer Erik Swyngedouw 
(2011: 372) as the “disappearance of the political”, and 
also “the de-territorialization and de-nationalisation 
of bio-political relations, primarily as the result of 
growing nomadism and the explosion of multi-place 
networked identities”. According to this definition, the 
community concept seems quite effective as a catalyst 
to re-establish legitimacy to the depleted public territ-
orial action, as a “post-democratic” (ibid: 371) response 
of socio-spatial configuration.
In this way, the community concept progresses as a 
similar construct as the complex forms of community 
action, namely the drive of groups of individuals 
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“to control and have responsibility for their own lives” 
(Gallent, Ciaffi 2014: 5). Different scholars and related 
research fields have analyzed these controversial as-
pects of community organizations and action in urban 
studies. In social policies, the community concept has 
been abundantly debated in recent years (Burrows et al. 
2000). In particular, social policy scholars underline the 
emphasis of the community concept in the self-help and 
inclusion policy design and practices, related to public 
health provision, social housing and local welfare in-
novation. In terms of economic geography analysis, the 
community concept has often been identified as a node of 
new complex polycentric governance scenarios (Ostrom 
2010). From this perspective, the different community 
units are leading to the disaggregation and decentraliz-
ation of central state power, transferring responsibilities 
towards what some scholars identify as civil society (Cox 
1999) while others refer to the phenomenon as volun-
tary aggregation of individuals creating a “spontaneous 
order” of spatial organization (Bladel 2005: 11). Due to 
this ambiguity in definition, communities have also 
come to be appointed as part of the “shift in neoliberal 
public governance” (Moore, McKee 2014: 521) and the 
retreat of the state from “the direct provision of pub-
lic goods, welfare and services, and its devolution of 
autonomy and responsibility for these needs to active 
and empowered citizens and communities” (ibid). The 
concept also comes to play a role in local assets in con-
trast with the globalization process against what Sassen 
(2001) defines as the perverse dynamics of global cities 
with communities acting as a tool of empowerment for 
local markets and endogenous growth factors (Shaffer 
et al. 2004). Furthermore, they have been considered for 
their potential role in “bracing” social capital (Holman, 
Rydin 2004), a valuable process leading to the sustain-
ability of local initiatives and trusted companion of local 
economic development policies (Dale, Newman 2010).
Taking into account this background, the objective 
of this work is to provide a theoretical contribution 
debating and remarking on two research questions:
First. How can we interpret community action com-
bining ethics and planning theories?
Second. Which are the interests that mobilize com-
munity actions (values) and which different spatial 
planning aspects (scale and ownership) can help us to 
frame different practices?
In order to address these questions, the paper pro-
ceeds as follows: the Section 2 describes four ethical 
theories through which we can look at community 
action. Section 3 discuss on three concepts related to 
community action and spatial planning: values, scale 
and ownership. Section 4 concludes by remarking how 
different interpretations raise general issues that refer 
to spatial planning, social organization and regulation 
related to community actions.
Methodology: ethics and community action
Before discussing on the ethics theories we must estab-
lish a general definition of the concept of community 
action and its spatial dimension. This should be con-
sidered as the action of a collective unit of individuals 
toward a common goal, generally related to the im-
provement of the living conditions within their hab-
itats or environments. In this sense, the improvement 
may be initiated through the:
 – Affirmation of a shared moral imperative;
 – Specific political and economic objectives.
In this contribution we aim to provide an original 
contribution on the ethical background of community 
organizations’ spatial practices2 (Crosta 2010). This 
contribution does not intend to generalize about these 
complex social phenomena, nor to provide an exact 
prevision of a methodological approach. It also does not 
intend to define a priori the order within the practices 
of “community action”, due to the fact that these are 
part of unpredictable forms of individual initiatives 
(Popper 1944; Hayek 1948). The possibility of realizing 
a general analytical framework can represent a mis-
leading argument, unable to build replicable models, 
evaluations and indicators or predict consequential 
outcomes. The ethical reflection is important to deeper 
understand the strategic moves of community in spa-
tial action. As Behnam and Rasche noticed (2009: 80), 
any “strategy process inevitably entails a way of reflec-
tion that is highly commensurable with the ethical 
reasoning process – no matter whether the strategist 
explicitly is aware of that or implicitly just follows the 
same procedures”. A literature review on the different 
ethical interpretations on community action is relevant 
if we adopt a reformist perspective on spatial planning. 
In this contribution we want to consider the ethical 
interpretation as an alternative of the orthodox vision 
given by the normative and prescriptive dimension of 
communities and social aggregations. For planning 
scholars, the adoption of different lens of analysis on 
community action can represent a tool of interpreta-
tion on changes occurring in the relationship between 
space and society and consequently a certain relation-
ship between state and society. Through the review of 
specific ethics theories, we can therefore observe the 
connections between certain conditions of community 
action: a priori values, “enabling” policies or regulative 
frameworks. For these reasons, and for requirements 
2 Other contributions adopting a similar methodological appro-
ach have been experimented by Moroni (1997) and Beatley (1994).
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related to the length of the present discussion, we want 
to consider the communitarian, the utilitarian, the 
libertarian and the geo-anarchist theories.
Communitarian
The first community action interpretation we want to 
consider is that provided by the communitarian the-
ory3. This theory was the first to emphasize the con-
nection between individuals and community. Between 
the slightly varying contributions of this thought, the 
common point is the affirmation of the community 
as a paradigm of shared values, as the origin of com-
munity rights and “communal responsibilities”. From 
these form a common knowledge that derives a coercive 
force in the use of “communitarian” goods from the 
individual members of a community. The shared goods 
that also represent the community boundaries include 
natural resources such as: “soils, waters, plants, and 
animals, or collectively: the land”, namely as a part of 
what ecologist scholars defined as “biotic communities” 
(Leopold 1949: 865–866). In this sense, the definition 
of a community can be variable according to different 
dimensions, considering the scale of a family, political 
state or nation. Therefore, the concept of community 
assumes a primary role in the construction of the 
ethical theory, as the shared conception and substant-
ive way to develop the moral values of individuals. 
According to Moroni (1997: 183) within this theory, 
the “idea of community” pretends to be seen as the 
shift from the atomistic perspective typical of the lib-
eral society. The community concept is also able to in-
vert the liberal rationales on the priority of rules rather 
than virtues. According to communitarian, the virtues 
are the communal elements on which the collective 
identity is based (MacIntyre 1984), the central element 
in the moral experience of individuals. With this per-
spective, communitarian theory intends to abandon 
the deontological ethic to adopt a radically teleological 
one, underlining the importance of the a priori shared 
common understanding of the “good life”.
Utilitarian
Beyond the differences that separate the various ver-
sions of utilitarianism4, the three key areas are:
3 Communitarian theories represent an important strand of 
contemporary ethics. The most important references of this ethical 
theory can be found in the works of Etzioni (1994), Sandel (1982) 
and Unger (1976).
4 Utilitarianism has been for long time the most relevant and 
explored research of modern western political philosophy. The 
classic formulation of utilitarianism was originally established by 
the works of Bentham (1970) and developed later by other authors 
including Jhon Stuart Mill (2010). With Pigou (1920) stating that 
this theory is applicable in economics, in the calculation tools of 
collective utility, such as cost-benefit analysis.
1) Consequentialism, namely the idea that ac-
tions are evaluated on the basis of the state of 
things that follow. According to this concept, 
spatial action can be judged depending on the 
consequences it produces on the present state 
of things.
2)  Welfarism, namely the assessment and eval-
uation on the change of the state of things 
expected from a spatial action. This is taken 
as a result of the information on the utility 
that accompanies it. The utility does not co-
incide with the individual’s pleasure or hap-
piness, but as the maximization of preferences 
between a group of individuals.
3)  Sum-ranking, namely the assessment tool for 
calculating the maximization of collective 
utility preferences.
The utilitarian theory is based on the principle of the 
autonomy of individual preference, which recognizes 
the supremacy of the individual in the evaluation of his/
her welfare and therefore of their usefulness. According 
to the principle of the constructive model (Harsanyi 
1979), individuals are addressed not only on personal 
preferences, but also from the moral preferences that 
lead individuals to move towards a collective behavior 
and action. Despite different social positions and dif-
ferent levels of well-being, the moral value becomes the 
guide for individuals to act rationally. The resulting ac-
tion of the community is to encourage the social situ-
ation that ensures the highest level of average utility in 
society. Particular communities, made of a collective of 
individuals and diverse social positions, are also driven 
by interpersonal utility comparisons (ibid) This com-
parison allows individuals to adopt impartial and sym-
pathetic point of views, abstracting their own personal 
preferences, entering a process of imaginative empathy. 
In this way you can compare the usefulness of different 
individuals according to a community database.
Libertarian
The libertarian idea of community is rooted in the belief 
that individuals are endowed with inherent rights to their 
existence that must be considered as universal, primar-
ily as moral rights and then as legal rights5. Among the 
various theories, the contribution of Nozick (1974) could 
be considered as the more interesting one when applied 
to land use issues and spatial action of communities and 
individuals. The main assumption of this theory is that 
5 Libertarian ethics are rooted in the evolution of natural law 
theories, see for instance the works of Von Pufendorf and Hert 
(1715) and Locke (1690). Among the various authors who have 
drawn recent versions of theory of rights we must consider Hayek 
(1960; 1988), Nozick (1974), Dworkin (1977) and Pollock (1996).
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the individuals are custodians of inviolable rights, inde-
pendently from any social organization. These rights can 
determine the external environment of each individual 
and fix the abilities lawfully available. In this sense, indi-
viduals do not represent resources available to society in 
general, but for themselves. There cannot be a “social en-
tity” above individuals able to interpret and draw the col-
lective benefits. This organization cannot happen without 
a concrete action formulated by individuals, characterized 
by substantial differences and separateness in the inten-
tions and plans for their lives (Nozick 1974: 36). The pos-
ition of this thesis is anti-consequentialist, namely taking 
a point of view that is indifferent to the results of collective 
actions in the final states of things (Moroni 1997: 76). In 
Nozick’s view, the property rights are the most important 
rights and a model for all others. Compared to the geo-an-
archist theories (presented below) the classical libertarian 
theory still supports a certain type of social organization 
with a better formula for maintaining individual rights as 
compared to anarchy (Nozick 1974: 3–5). In the analysis 
developed about the state of nature, Nozick points out the 
role of mutual aid associations as a solver on the disputes 
between individuals, describing them as a form of pro-
tective associations of individual rights. Within these, the 
dominant protective association will emerge as a natural 
monopolist in a given geographical area. The task of this 
specific association is to efficiently manage conflicts and 
assure the respect of individuals’ rights. The dichotomy 
between independent individuals and the dominant pro-
tective association is also known as the concept of min-
imum state. A minimum state is one that protects those 
individuals that finance it voluntarily according to the 
principle of compensation, namely to compensate for the 
disadvantage caused to anyone for performing activities 
that may prove detrimental to others. The key concept is 
the independence of individuals to participate or not in 
supporting the dominant association, having in both of 
the cases the security of fundamental rights recognition 
and acceptance of the performance of minimum justice 
guaranteed by this recognition.
Geo-anarchist
To understand what Geo-anarchists intend as a com-
munity, we must first establish the classic distinction 
between the public sector, that which is authorized 
through the use of coercion, and the private sector, 
the sector characterized by voluntary actions6. As 
defined by Moroni (2010: 7), “in the first case the key 
6 Among the authors who have dealt with this there are the theo-
retical contribution on the relationship between public goods and 
private communities proposed by Foldvary (1994) and the latest 
private residential communities (Nelson 2005) and contractual 
communities (Brunetta, Moroni 2012).
elements are characteristic of sovereignty, authority 
and one-sidedness of the law; in the second, the con-
sensual, equality, multilateralism, the contract”. The 
geo-anarchist theory describes communities solely as 
a contractual expression typical of the private sector 
in combination with spatial-based formulas to which 
members adhere voluntarily on the basis of a unanim-
ously signed contract. The term geo-anarchist derives 
from the vision of a society organized as a polycentric 
group of voluntary and contractual communities, 
“based on sovereign individuals” (Foldvary 2001: 404). 
In the theory of Fred Foldvary (2001), this vision is 
that of complete decentralization of powers within a 
cosmos of “voluntary cities” formed by small groups 
or individuals and families. According to this view, 
the distinction between the government and private 
sector would disappear as “voluntary governance it 
would be based on contracts among private members 
and property owners” (ibid). Foldvary’s criticism of 
the centralization of public governments derives from 
his analysis of Austrian public choice theories and 
Governance Structure, based on the fundamental as-
pects of “decentralized nature of knowledge, the sub-
jective nature of values and preferences, the disaggreg-
ation of phenomena, [... ] the analysis of spontaneous 
order and the productivity of roundabout investment 
[...] ” (Foldvary 2002: 162).
Value, scale and ownership: three crucial 
concepts
The interpretations on the concepts like value, scale 
and ownership can help us to describe the specific 
motivations and outcomes that can drive community 
towards an action or spatial initiative.
Value could be seen as:
 – intrinsic or a priori, a constitutive aspect shared by 
all community members;
 – extrinsic, a tool to achieve the aggregation of pref-
erences within the policy process and/or as an ex-
pression of individuals’ freedom through a logic 
of mutual objectives and contractual community 
agreements.
The scale concept describes the spatial limit that 
communities have regarding their values. Different in-
terpretations and observations in practices reveal how 
different spatial demands or issues of a community can 
define (or not) the boundaries of a specific geographical 
area. The scale can range between local communities, 
transactional or virtual, with or without connotations 
and requires reinforcement through a spatial proximity.
The definition of the role of ownership shows how 
and why communities need to own specific assets as 
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well as how and why ownership schemes are organized 
due to differing objectives are vital components. The 
role of ownership is a crucial aspect identifying the 
shift from motivation to practices, determining sub-
stantially the results of the action of local communities. 
This factor is also important in understanding the con-
nection between community actions and the regulatory 
framework of certain activities and organizations.
Values
The discussion on values within community action 
proposes to respond to the question: what are the 
features and specific interests that propel community 
initiatives? As mentioned in the previous section, we 
intend to divide the community value of community 
action into two groups (Fig. 1): community as intrinsic 
value and community as extrinsic Value.
Community as intrinsic value. It is a concept strictly 
linked to the communitarian theory that consider the 
relational dimension and the moral imperative of com-
munity existence. It overshadows both the individual 
dimension and the community as an instrumental tool 
of spatial action. The construction of shared values is 
seen as the primary driver of community action. The 
path of intangible assets construction is the basic re-
quirement for any form of action, starting from com-
munity values. The instrumental (or extrinsic) action 
follows only as a second step as an outcome of the main 
process of identification and affirmation of a com-
munity’s intrinsic values. In brief, every intrinsic value 
produces an extrinsic action, but this must never be 
considered as the fundamental imperative of the com-
munity. For instance, extrinsic values of Eco-villages 
can be considered according to a communitarian-based 
choice “to live together with a common purpose, work-
ing cooperatively to create a lifestyle that reflects their 
shared core values” (Kozeny 1995: 18). The features 
of an intrinsic value of a community are explained in 
depth in the contribution of Shiell and Hawe (1996: 
242) “community relations are a feature of individual 
identity and well-being. Community means more than 
association or shared location. It also means more than 
the inclusion of interpersonal effects (externalities) in 
the individual’s utility function. The intrinsic and not 
just the instrumental value of social relationships is 
important”. Furthermore, life of individuals included 
in an intrinsic value community is encompassed in 
a common framework of the shared values. In Eco-
villages, the ecologist and “biotic community” theory 
(Leopold 1949) is reflected in the use of “green building 
techniques, for example, constructing buildings that 
are made from earthen materials, and situate housing 
units around green space for subsistence gardening. 
Villages are purposefully laid out to maximize utility 
from the environment and to diminish excessive use of 
resources as well as to foster community interaction” 
(Ergas 2010: 34).
Community as extrinsic value. In these groups of 
communities are also included the community actions 
defined by ethical theories that strongly consider the 
role of individuals, as single entities with distinctive 
values, independently formed. Starting from this as-
sumption, the community must be considered an ex-
trinsic tool with two separate kinds of expected results:
First, (considering the utilitarian approach) the 
community represent an aggregation of preferences 
and inter-personal comparison of utilities, perform-
ing as a tool capable of meeting the different object-
ives between individuals (Harsanyi 1979). The action 
in this case aims to produce consequential outcomes, 
such as the implementation of policies or introduction 
of new forms of urban governance. The community 
action is moved to target individuals’ common interests 
and preferences, producing advocacy for political em-
powerment. Social capital can also be considered a 
key resource in this first definition of extrinsic com-
munity as an enabling tool of collective action (Rydin, 
Pennington 2000). As defined by Ostrom (2000: 176), 
social capital “is the shared knowledge, understand-
ings, norms, rules and expectations about patterns of 
interactions that groups of individuals bring to a re-
current activity”. With these operations, communities 
can valorize the organization of human and physical 
capital, helping individuals to “coordinate activity and 
credibility commitment (…) to a sequence of future 
actions” (ibid).
Second (considering libertarian and geo-anarchist 
approaches) the community represent the outcome of 
voluntary agreements or contractual formulas between 
private individuals, taken as a collective action for eco-
nomic empowerment and self-organization objectives. 
The priority of these initiatives have been defined in what 
Jacobs (1961) and Hayek (1988) described as “spontan-
eous order” of spatial organization. A purely voluntary 
approach in the geo-anarchist perspective (Foldvary 
2001: 404) sees community organization operating in 
two ways: evolution or devolution. The evolutionary 
method consists of the contractual adhesion of single 
individual households into an association for providing 
services for the members. This approach is suitable for a 
local scale consisting of a few households. In this case, 
a governing body can be elected by the members, del-
egating some authority to the board. The main task of 
this authority is to separate private and collective goods 
and provide local services funded by its members. The 
devolution method consists of the transfer of political 
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authority, property and programs to a lower level of 
governance. This approach consists of the broad idea 
of recognizing neighbourhood association coalitions 
as a new and separate jurisdiction. Besides the phe-
nomenon of private cities nowadays diffused through-
out India and China (Rajagopalan, Tabarrok 2014), an 
interesting example on the devolutionary approach is 
represented from the case of the voluntary city of Reston 
(Virginia). This census-designated place (without any 
local public administration) contains contractual and 
private schemes of governance comprised of a coalition 
of homeowners associations with 50.000 inhabitants 
and 24.000 dwellings (Foldvary 1994).
Scale
The definition of a specific scale of community action 
aims to respond to the question: Which community 
spatial scale do we refer to when we talk about com-
munity action? We can summarize this concept in 
relationship to either single or intertwined aspects: 
as either a consequence of issues and opportunities 
related to residential proximity or as the product of 
active exchange across social networks and cooper-
ation within local political and economic dynamics.
For communitarians we cannot consider the com-
munity as a static concept or set of relationships arising 
from casual residential proximity without any type of 
defined motivation. The actions of the community are 
defined by individuals’ common values. According to 
Delanty (2003), the definition of community boundar-
ies has an indefinite nature that cannot be matched to 
a particular group or place, but to a particular size and 
ideal interpretation. By examining local action in com-
munitarian organizations, the scale of the community 
can be defined by a common fellowship or community 
of relations or feelings (Levinson, Christensen 2003). 
In this case, the connections within a community or-
ganization can represent an informal network formed 
by different individuals, specific groups and organiza-
tions who identify themselves in a network of interde-
pendence regarding a common set of responsibilities 
(Gilchrist 2004; Brint 2001). The procedure to define 
a network of agreed shared values and mutual under-
standing can take considerable time and effort and 
the employment of expert facilitators, such as com-
munity organizers (Stein 1986). In this vein a relevant 
example in determining such networks (also as a polit-
ical movement) are through the activities developed 
by the Association of Community Organizations for 
Reform Now (ACORN), an international coalition of 
community-based organizations that advocate for low 
and moderate income families by working on neigh-
borhood safety, voter registration, health care, afford-
able housing, and other social issues (Rathke 2009). 
At its peak ACORN had over 500,000 members and 
more than 1,200 neighbourhood chapters in over 100 
cities across the U.S., as well as in Argentina, Canada, 
Mexico, and Peru (Farrell 2009). In the ACORN exper-
ience difficulty of maintaining a large-scale network of 
“shared values” is evident when looking at the causes of 
the ruinous end of the experience of their experience7.
In a utilitarian perspective, community scale can 
also be considered from a prescriptive and normative 
dimension, according to a specific planning level or 
policy in a localist agenda. In this way different scales of 
community arise as an aggregative tool for a plan-mak-
ing and decision-making process, with the objective 
to improve certain policy outcomes. In this group we 
can frame the practices of associative action in urban 
planning (Messaoudène et al. 2014) associated with the 
intent of local level political empowerment. With this 
idea over the last several decades we’ve observed an 
intense season of public policies arising with the aim 
of matching urban planning and transformation with 
local communities’ involvement. The community scale 
in this view has been defined by interests, also inter-
preted as an advocacy tool to lead towards participa-
tion in the planning process (Davidoff, Reiner 1962; 
Davidoff 1965). According to Balducci (1991: 158), the 
objectives can also be related to the improvement of 
planning effectiveness: through specific community en-
gagement policies, depending on the proper represent-
ation of needs and social demand, or as a way to enable 
engagement of weak community groups (in terms of 
political and economic power) in policy-making. Some 
scholars interpret the scale of the “interests network” 
as a variable due to the nodes of aggregation of social 
7 It was the involvement of some members in irregular funding 
The community scale can also be considered from a political and 
normative practices that led to the dissolution of the group in 2010. 
On March 010, the ACORN national organization’s board decided 
to close remaining state affiliates and field offices by April 1 due to 
falling revenues (Smith 2010).
fig. 1. a scheme of community action geography according 
to values and maximum-scaled reach for single action 
typology (elaborated by the author)
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capital in terms of close relationships between people 
that are keen to achieve common goals. Regardless, it 
is generally accepted that the “conditions for this to 
happen are quiet extreme (…) in procedural terms but 
also in terms of expectations of the actors involved” 
(Rydin 2014: 32).
In between utilitarian and libertarian perspectives 
we can observe practices related to asset-based com-
munity organizations and enterprises (Tricarico 2016; 
Bailey 2012; Aiken et al. 2011). Following Somerville 
and McElwee’s definition (2011: 319) of the term “enter-
prise”, we refer to “an activity that produces or aims to 
produce value that can be expressed in monetary terms 
and any individual that is responsible for producing 
such value is commonly called an “entrepreneur”. The 
scale of this enterprises is linked towards “community” 
trading systems with a strong social purpose in rela-
tion to a defined population or sub-group living in a 
geographically defined area (Bailey 2012: 4). The social 
purpose is what social enterprises theorists like Pearce 
(2003: 25) defined as “engaging in trade in the mar-
ketplace; not distributing profits to individuals; hold-
ing assets and wealth in trust for community benefit; 
democratically involving members of its constituency 
in the governance of the organization; being independ-
ent organizations accountable to a defined constituency 
and to the wider community”. This is for instance the 
case of Development Trusts in the United Kingdom (Le 
Xuan, Tricarico 2014), legally registered as third sec-
tor bodies: Charities, Community Interest Company 
(CIC), Industrial and Provident Society. Development 
Trust activities are self-sustaining through acquiring 
assets to enable growth and income-generating streams 
to support other social functions. They are also often 
engaged in local and national trading operations or 
contract income, all financial surpluses generated 
enable greater operational autonomy and are applied 
to the social objectives of the organization and the 
community projects it runs/supports. The quality of 
services delivered is managed at the Trust level and 
are monitored through reporting procedures. CIC 
and charity regulators control the social and com-
munity accountability of the activities. According to 
Di Domenico et al. (2009) “Development Trusts are em-
bedded in social entrepreneurship, a paradox given that 
this kind of entrepreneurship is being promoted as a 
‘solution’ to social and economic problems often caused 
by market failure”. This idea follows the shift towards 
“community” politics as an important component of 
civil society, a marked trend that some commentat-
ors have included in the broader concept of the “Third 
Way” (Giddens 1998), where community enterprises 
make up a relatively small part of the social economy.
According a more focused geo-anarchist perspect-
ive, we must take into account other kinds of com-
munity actions, defined by certain literature as con-
tractual communities (Brunetta, Moroni 2012). The 
Members join these communities on the basis of a 
contract (or agreement) that is unanimously accepted 
in light of the expected benefits. The contract estab-
lishes a set of commitments and rights for the members. 
Within the commitments there is the respect of rules 
of cohabitation (such as the rules in land use and pre-
scription of private and collective spaces, behavioral 
and other general rules). There is also the obligation to 
pay some form of monetary contribution (or supply a 
service) to ensure the proper functioning of the con-
tractual community itself. Within the rights there is 
the availability of goods and the provision of collective 
services. Contractual communities are scaled both by 
hardware (such as buildings, spaces, goods) and soft-
ware (such as rules and organization). According to 
MacCallum (1970) the bases to form a contractual com-
munity (and so defining the scale of action) relies on: (i) 
a group of individuals with one ore more common in-
terests, (ii) a territory with identifiable boundaries, (iii) 
an integrative system of organization that regulates the 
activities required for the community’s operation and 
continuity. These three aspects explicate in a binding 
agreement; that is, via a voluntarily accepted contract. 
According to Brunetta and Moroni (2012), observa-
tion of local contractual communities practices follows 
three approaches: leasehold with a single owner who 
rents through a contract to a community of tenants, 
such as shopping mall or hotels; freehold as a coalition 
of multiple owners that manages common spaces and 
services, such as homeowner associations, cohousing or 
condominiums; commonhold as collective ownership 
(mostly cooperatives) that entails privileges and duties 
for the members in regard to the use of property, such 
as housing cooperatives and certain forms of collective 
private ownership of natural resources8, the so-called 
“commons” in Ostrom’s usage (1990). Another relevant 
reflection at the scale of contractual communities can 
be carried out by analyzing particular practices of “vir-
tual local currencies” not only as relational networks of 
economic action or institutional laboratory but also as a 
spatial action factor. The case of Sardex is an interesting 
experience of a regional Local Exchange Trading and 
Credit Scheme between small enterprises and the local 
financial institutions of the Italian Region of Sardinia. 
The motivation came from what they define as the 
idea that “enabling proximity-based and trust-based 
8 Two related Italian examples are the so-called “Regole” in 
Cortina D’Ampezzo and the Cento “Partecipanze” (Minora 2008).
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relations” foster “economic empowerment of a defined 
local territory; creating a resilient and vibrant com-
munity; and defining a more equitable environment for 
trading” (Littera et al. 2014: 5). This goal of economic 
and political empowerment enables a certain virtual 
scale of community through a credit unit that is not 
convertible into any other currency. It can only be spent 
and acquired through the members who voluntarily 
accepted the rules of the scheme in a “digital” field 
of action. This field also issues mutual credit without 
interests along with many tools and services provided 
to the network by the network service provider (e.g. 
brokering, business networking events, community 
management, online services, helpdesk) (ibid). These 
types of community action overcome the traditional 
framework of public and large private financial insti-
tution allowing a virtual community of entrepreneurs 
to self-organize financial transactions and promote 
investments in a defined geographical area9.
The role of ownership
The definition of the role of ownership by community 
members is a crucial issue significantly dividing dif-
ferent types of local action. In considering the role of 
ownership, the dichotomy of property of goods and 
the relational dimension of community values is in-
tertwined significantly in relation to the role and the 
resulting configuration of the space where the action 
takes place.
In a communitarian perspective, property takes 
a secondary role and the concept of “common good” 
is emphasized as the ideal. From this perspective, the 
concept of ownership is closely linked to the negative 
consideration of concepts like individuality, autonomy, 
personal aspirations and prevailing aspects in the other 
kinds of actions. The virtues and moral rules of the 
community totally disregard the formulas of prop-
erty, which become exclusively instrumental in their 
affirmation. An interesting example of this role can 
be clearly observed in the management formula of 
Prinzessinnengarten in Berlin (Kreuzberg). The cur-
rent organization promotes community action from 
an “idealist motivation” concerning issues such as the 
preservation of green areas of the city, the ecological 
education and the fight against gentrification of neigh-
borhoods the city center and the promotion of urban 
agriculture with the aims of social inclusion. The free 
access community garden is a space that Bendt et al. 
(2013: 28) defines as a generator of a “sense-of-place 
and experiential learning about local ecosystems”, 
9 Currently (2014) the community is made of more than 2K enter-
prises and 85M euros of economic transactions (www.sardex.net)
representing “arenas or environmental learning in 
cities”. Over the years, the community leaders of this 
space have set up agricultural activities in a mobile 
formula through the use of mobile pots and a num-
ber of caravans and prefabricated transportable units. 
This choice stems from the concern that when, and if, 
Berlin’s local government would decide to revoke the 
authorization to use the public land, they can easily 
relocate elsewhere, remaining independent from the 
potential confines of the current location. Other ex-
amples of community as an intrinsic value are those 
that have been defined in some American literature as 
eco-villages (Christian 2007: 29; Dawson 2006). These 
communities are organized in nomadic or perman-
ent situations, often settling in residual areas or geo-
graphically remote from cities and inhabited areas. 
Individuals wishing to join must be willing to accept 
values and rules arising from a strong communitarian 
and ecologist matrix. In these types of communities 
there is no private property and the location corres-
ponds to the availability to use spaces that allow them 
to develop their community-based ideals of life un-
disturbed. The role of ownership in organizations of 
this kind is particularly important when operating at 
a larger scale such as with environmental associations 
and social movements. For movements like “No Tav”, 
for example, the control (not ownership) of the land 
becomes the intrinsic value of the community. A genu-
ine process of collective identification with a particular 
intended use of the territory stems from the special 
values shared by the community and is essential to the 
collective welfare (Fedi et al. 2012). In this way, the 
community stands in conflict with the public power 
and to the principle of the general interest linked to 
strategic national infrastructure projects such as high-
speed rail networks for example (Greyl et al. 2012). An 
opposition to any form of dialogue to government ac-
tion often follows and a consequent antagonist action 
of local presidium. The land, or at least this specific idea 
of land ownership, even if not claimed as a community 
property, is claimed as an intrinsic driver of community 
belonging and value.
According to the theories based on extrinsic com-
munity value (utilitarian, libertarian and geo-an-
archist) community action can refer to an ownership 
role that can be defined as a “commonhold contrac-
tual community” (Moroni 2014: 45) or as Ostrom 
(1990) simply suggests, the “commons”. In this sense, 
Moroni (2014: 46) recognizes a relevant issue related 
to the usual interpretation of commons as a different 
kind of property or as a third alternative to public and 
private property. This seems true only if we consider 
private property as a kind of property always owned 
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by a single individual for his or her sole use. But this 
is a misconception: community ownership can take 
very different forms, including several kinds of collect-
ive private property. The literature has generally con-
sidered private properties as “a kind of property always 
owned by a single individual for his or her sole use” 
(ibid) without taking into account the different forms 
and particular management schemes and rules of their 
use. In the survey and research by Aiken et al. (2011) on 
“Community based organization controlling asset” it 
can be seen that a large number of these organizations 
base their activities in owning or controlling assets as 
collective properties. Within these organizations are 
included village halls, development trusts, settlement 
and social action centers, community centers, com-
munity farms, community land trusts, arts/cultural 
centers, sports centers, community wind farms, com-
munity shops, religious or faith centers, preservation 
or heritage trusts, advocacy and advice centers, park 
trusts and housing co-operatives. A surprisingly large 
number of respondents (63%) “indicated that they fully 
owned their most significant asset, while (19%) repor-
ted that they were leasing or renting it”. This report in-
dicates that, in addition to the current policy attention 
to asset transfer in certain countries like UK, there is a 
pre-existing cohort of organizations active in the field 
of contractual and collective private ownership schemes. 
This result would also be consistent with the historical 
studies that the research refers to (Woodin et al. 2010).
In recent years, the role of different “forms of com-
munity and mutual ownership (...) are still in existence 
and available today. Managing, sustaining and develop-
ing this older stock represents an important issue that 
requires further consideration”. Furthermore, looking 
at the property purposes declared by these community 
organizations10, only a part of these explicitly state the 
concept of “enhancing social well-being” (Fig. 2). Some 
of the other highest responses regarding the purpose of 
the organizations in terms of the aim of asset ownership 
underline the importance of other aspects like: “gen-
eral community uses”; “offering a base for the activities 
of other organizations”; “housing our organization’s 
activities”; and “providing office/administrative space 
for our organization”. A significant example of extrinsic 
community action that should be considered in the 
discussion of the role of ownership is that in charge 
of developments and management of local energy sys-
tems. These organizations appointed to manage new 
initiatives are an entirely new gamut of opportunities 
in collective energy production and management. The 
10  Answering a specific question on the purposes given by orga-
nizations for the different owned assets.
nodes of this new polycentric system of energy pro-
duction will not be – solely and merely – individual 
homes, stores, or industries (as is often considered, also 
in terms of new legislative measures: “Contemporary 
policy makers commonly approach energy demand 
issues with an individualistic model of attitudes and 
choice”: Goulden et al. 2014), but also in new forms of 
“intentional communities” and “voluntary communit-
ies” (Brunetta, Moroni 2012). Whilst in the traditional 
centralized energy system, demand and supply occupy 
separate spheres; here they are in direct connection. 
Clearly, this smart grid does not need to be a public 
utility; nor need it be unique or universal. We can ima-
gine a situation with myriads of micro-grids working 
in parallel with wider grids or running in isolation (i.e. 
in a totally separated way: “islanded”). Such a scenario 
does away not only with alleged intrinsic reasons for 
a “natural” monopoly of energy production, but also 
with the idea of natural distribution monopolies. We 
should consider these community energy enterprises as 
“community technology” namely as a sub-category of 
“social technology” that “denote dependable expertise 
in voluntary social organization and exchange” (Lowi, 
MacCallum 2014).
Concluding remarks
Looking at the framework of community actions re-
ported in the analysis, we can make a series of useful 
reflections to understand how these features allude to 
a specific interpretation of both the background of a 
particular social organization as well as the policies 
and rules designed to enable action.
First of all, it must be repeated that none of the prac-
tices framed has characteristics definable as “replicable 
models” or belong to a specific group of features carried 
out from the examples mentioned. This is impossible 
because:
 – On one hand (as stated above) it is necessary to as-
sume and emphasize that each initiative belongs 
to a particular place and individuals with specific 
fig.  2. Community asset and purposes according to jrf 
survey on CBos (aiken et al. 2011)
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peculiarities. These are unpredictable, not replic-
able and do not belong to groups that may be exactly 
categorized.
 – On the other hand, the objective is to explore the 
“community action” topic with no pretense of pro-
ducing exemplary methodological tools, an aspect 
that in the same vein Popper (1944) underlined as 
a general social sciences bias: the impossibility to 
“determine trends” because the analysis could be 
affected by relativism and therefore unable to in-
duce “social change” and create effective tools of 
planning.
According to this premise, the analysis of the lit-
erature and practices of intrinsic and extrinsic com-
munity actions seem to meet different issues.
First. The limit of shared community values as a 
fundamental and irreplaceable ingredient of a just “so-
cial action” ignoring the private sphere of individuals 
and families, as well as the importance of individu-
als’ preferences, wishes, resources and dynamic ex-
pectations. This is true when observing some radical 
communitarian practices like eco-villages and social 
movements in a local scale, but also with some en-
vironmental associations or communitarian-based 
coalitions (as discussed above regarding ACORN). 
According to communitarian theories, instrumental 
political or economic tools of extrinsic action are blind 
to the fundamental importance of “full participation in 
political community for the good life of human being” 
(Buchanan 1989: 852).
Second. The limit of avoiding the crucial debate 
on democratic “social choices” and the importance of 
pledging equal capabilities within communities and 
individuals (Sen 1990). The simplification through the 
imposition of “communal values” within community 
members underrates the compatibility and conflict is-
sues of wicked problems (i.e. land-use, climate change, 
infrastructure planning ; Lindblom 1959; Geissler et al. 
2017). These issues raise widely discussed, yet complex 
questions within the debate of public and collective 
choices in planning. These aspects have been mostly 
disregarded by communitarian theories and practices, 
applying a radically teleological critique, forsaking re-
flection on what might be the correct strategy in a given 
territory, but moves instead to the search for what must 
be done to assure “shared” practice of the good life.
Third. The importance of neutral communica-
tion and precise objectives of extrinsic community 
actions, thereby putting more emphasis on the know-
ledge based community agreements like contracts or 
entrepreneurial organizations. This approach is true 
for the extrinsic use of community relations, in order 
to enforce the action through the explicit statement 
of why and how communities move and for which 
specific advantages. This basic principle for effective 
“social choices” in community action leads to acquire 
knowledge for the selection of irrelevant or more or 
less important actions or strategies (see for instance 
Sen 1977). In this sense, we can consider the political 
empowerment of extrinsic communities biased: It is 
not convincing that communities can be an effective 
product of a common framework within individuals’ 
desires and expectations and produce an exact tool of 
preference aggregation. In the same vein a point to be 
stressed is also that extrinsic community actions pur-
pose can can be both for-profit and non-profit. There 
is no inherent reason that requires community owner-
ship to be a “third party”, “non-profit” body (as some 
instead seem to believe). The distinction between for-
profit and non-profit is not as important as has been 
maintained; in both cases, the extrinsic community 
actions can be considered as voluntary and entrepren-
eurial action within the civil society (Beito et al. 2002). 
The idea itself of entrepreneurship is not necessarily 
tied to the profit of single individuals; it can regard any 
type of activity, including group activity (Cato et al. 
2008). Many misunderstandings have resulted from 
a certain use of the term “community”. Often used by 
community development studies the concept of “com-
munity” creates confusion because in many cases it is 
used, not as a descriptive concept, but as a value-laden 
one identifying something that is “good” in and of it-
self. In this sense, extrinsic community actions like 
community enterprises are “communities of choice” 
or “intentional communities”, not “communities of 
chance” or “community of fate”, but are “rule-bound 
communities” (Moroni 2014).
Fourth. The knowledge limit of extrinsic communit-
ies based on private individuals’ contractual agree-
ments. The action promoted by these agreements can 
on the one hand seem particularly legitimate, while 
on the other seem to underestimate the different func-
tioning of a plurality of groups (i.e. informative and 
economic disadvantages). The aims of “insulated” 
voluntary communities avoid the issues associated 
with a deep knowledge of external communities’ aims 
and needs. This lack of information can represent a 
potential conflict within a self-organized polycentric 
spatial distribution of communities. If the priority of 
community action relies solely on negative freedom 
within a group of individuals, it can result in a fail-
ure to promote social interactions between different 
groups. As Ostrom (2010: 659) underlined, “the as-
sumption that individuals have complete information 
about all actions available to them, the likely strategies 
that others will adopt, and the probabilities of specific 
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consequences that will result from their own choices, 
must be rejected in any but the very simplest of repeated 
settings”. Furthermore, even if we accept contractual 
communities as an effective tool of action regarding 
individuals’ economic empowerment and freedom, 
we cannot ignore the dependency of these factors with 
global conflicts of contemporary societies (Dahrendorf 
1988). In this sense the distributive principles are also 
relevant for an approach based on individuals’ freedom; 
the conflicts between interests, efficiency and equity; 
all aspects that community organizations and society 
as a whole must cope with and not avoid.
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